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Summary  findings
The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine  State capture, influence, and administrative corruption
how the state interacts with firms, but little attention  has  are all shown to have distinct causes and consequences.
been paid to  the flip side of the relationship: how firms  Large incumbent firms with formal ties to the state tend
influence the state-especially  how they exert influence  to inherit influence as a legacy of the past and tend to
on and collude with public officials to extract  enjoy more secure property and contractual  rights and
advantages. Some firms in transition economies have  higher growth rates. To compete against these influential
been able to shape the rules of the game to their own  incumbents, new entrants turn to state capture as a
advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what  strategic choice-not  as a substitute for innovation but to
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann call a "capture economy"  compensate for weaknesses in the legal and regulatory
in many countries. In the capture economy, public  framework. When the state underprovides the public
officials and politicians privately sell underprovided  goods needed for entry and competition, "captor"  firms
public goods and a range of rent-generating advantages  purchase directly from the state such private benefits as
"a la carte" to individual firms.  secure property rights and removal of obstacles to
The authors empirically investigate the dynamics of the  improved performance-but  only in a capture economy.
capture economy on the basis of new firm-level data  Consistent with empirical findings in previous research
from the 1999 Business  Environment and Enterprise  on petty corruption,  administrative corruption-unlike
Performance Survey (BEEPS),  which permits the  both capture and influence-is  not associated with
unbundling of corruption into meaningful and  specific benefits for the firm.
measurable components.  The focus of reform should be shifted toward
They contrast state capture (firms shaping and  channeling firms' strategies in the direction of more
affecting formulation of the rules of the game through  legitimate forms of influence, involving societal "voice,"
private payments to public officials and politicians) with  transparency reform, political accountability, and
influence (doing the same without recourse to payments)  economic competition. Where state capture has distorted
and with administrative corruption ("petty" forms of  reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic structures
bribery in connection with the implementation of laws,  supported  by powerful political interests, the challenge is
rules, and regulations). They develop economywide  particularly daunting.
measures for these phenomena, which are then subject to
empirical measurement utilizing the BEEPS  data.
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'f only  want to drawyour  attention  straightaway  to the  fact thatyou ha  veyourselves  formed  this verg  state,  to a
large  extent through  political  and quasi-political  structures  underyour  control.  So perhaps  what one  should  do
least  of  all is blame  the mirror.  "
Vladimir Putin's  opening remarks to a roundtable  of 21 of Russia's leading oligarchs
(Washington Post, July 29, 2000)
1. Introduction
In  designing reform  strategies  in  the initial stages  of  transition  in Eastern  Europe  aud  the
former Soviet Union, the dominant  challenge was to reduce and reorient the state's role in the
economy.  In  particular,  the  strategies  of  liberalization  and  privatization  were  intended  to
change the way in which  the  state interacts  with firms,  shifting from  command  methods  to
market mechanisms. Throughout  the transition, little attention  has been paid to the flipside of
this  relationship,  namely  the  ways in which  firms exert  influence  on  the  state. Yet  in  the
context  of weak states and underdeveloped  civil societies, such forms  of influence  have had a
powerful impact on the pace and direction of reforms, on  the design of economic and political
institutions  and,  ultimately, on  the  general quality of governance  in the  transition  countries.
After  only a decade  of  transition,  the  fear of  the lehiathan  state has  been  replaced  by  a new
concern  about  powerful  oligarchs  who  manipulate  politicians,  shape  institutions,  and  control
the media to advance and protect  their own empires at the expense of the social interest.
From a political economy  perspective, our understanding  of the main obstacles in the path of
transition  has  generally  been  guided  by  an  image  of  the  state  as  a  "grabbing  hand"
discriminating  against firms with  low bargaining  power  to  maximize the private  interests  of
politicians  and bureaucrats.'  Yet  a recognition  that powerful  firms have been  able to  capture
the  state and  collude with public  officials to extract  rents  through  the manipulation  of  state
power  suggests that there  are other  dimensions of the relationship between  the state and firms
that could further enrich  our understanding  of the political constraints  on the reform  process.
By analyzing  the  dynamics  of  the  capture  economy,  we  can build  a  stronger  foundation  for
incorporating  the political constraints  on reform  into the development  of feasible strategies to
advance the transition.
In  addition,  a  focus  on  the  ways  in  which  firms  interact  with  the  state  has  important
implications  for  our  understanding  of the  dynamics of  corruption.  Existing  studies  tend  to
treat  corruption  as a generic, one-dimensional  phenomenon  without  distinguishing  between
forms  of extortion  in which rents are monopolized  by public officials and forms  of influence
and  collusion between  firms and public officials in which the rents are shared.'  Yet surely the
roots  of  these  relationships  differ,  as well  as their  consequences  for  the  firm  and  for  the
IThe  'grabbing  hand'  image of the state was proposed  and developed  by Shleifer  and Vishny  (1998).  The view of bribery  as
the  costly  outcome  of  bureaucratic  harassment  is elaborated  in  Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1999).  Previous  studies  focusing  on
corruption  to get  around  red  tape  regulations  tended  to  portray  corruption  as an efficient  informal  deregulatory  devise (the
'grease'  argument,  see  Leff  1964; Huntington  1978;  and Liu  1986), in  contrast  with  the  recent  bureaucracy-induced  'sand'
argument  and evidence suggesting  that bribery  does not  alleviate administrative  harassment.
2Some  studies  of corruption  do  recognise different  forms of  the problem  - most commonly,  grand  versus petty corruption
-- although  the emphasis  has tended  to  be on  the overall  level of  corruption  and not  the nature  of relationship  between  the
state and the firm. Existing  studies  also tend  to assume,  often implicitly, that all forms of corruption  are highly correlated  and
that  the  causes and  consequences  of different  forms  of corruption  are roughly  similar.  See, for  example,  Ades  and di Tella
(1997), Kaufmann  (2000), and Wei  (1999).3
broader  econornic  environment.  Unbundling the  concept  of  corruption  in  transition
economies should provide a richer basis for our analysis  of the problem and for policy  advice.
This paper is an initial step to investigate empirically  what characterizes  different types of
relationships between firms and the state, and how they affect the performance of the firm,
the state's role in the economy, and the development of a dynamic enterprise sector.  We
distinguish between three types of relationships marked by different distributions of rents
between the firm and the state. - state capture, influence and administrative  corruption. State
capture is defined as shaping  the  formation  of the  basic  rules  of the  game  (i.e.  laws, rules, decrees and
regulations)  through illicit  and non-transparent private payments to public officials.' Influence
refers to the firm's capacity  to have an impact on the formation of  the basic rules of the game
without  necessary  recourse to private  payments to public officials (as a result of such factors as
firm  size, ownership  ties  to  the  state  and  repeated  interactions with  state  officials).
Administrative corruption is defined as piivate  payments to  public officials to  distort the
prescribed implementation  of official  rules and policies.
Capture, influence and administrative  corruption are examined from two perspectives - the
firm level and the country level. First, we attempt to measure and compare the extent of these
different phenomena across the transition countries.  Then, we seek to determine the factors  at
the firm level that shape the degree of the firm's influence  on the state and its propensity to
engage in capture. Finally, we assess the private costs and benefits of different forms of
influence  to the firm and contrast them with the social  costs at the country level.
The analysis  of capture, corruption and influence is based on data from the 1999 Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey  (BEEPS),  a firm-level  survey commissioned
joindy by the EBRD and the World Bank to assess obstacles in the business environment
across 22 transition economies. 4 The survey data allow us to unbundle the measurement of
influence and corruption into specific components, as well as to examine a number of key
questions regarding state capture for the very first time.  Moreover, the BEEPS survey offers
significant  methodological  improvements over existing  governance and corruption indices in
that it relies on the direct experience of firms rather than external assessments  and, wherever
possible,  uses cardinal  estimates  of the extent of corruption. 5
3Of  course,  firms  are  not  the  only  organizations  that  can  capture  the  state.  However,  we  are primarily  interested  in  the
relationship  between  firms and the state as a foundation  for understanding  the political  dynamics of economic  reform.
4 TI'he  BEEPS  is the first stage of a world-wide  survey of firms on the obstades  in the business  environment  conducted  by the
World  Bank  in  co-operation  with  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD),  Inter-American
Development  Bank  and  the Harvard  Institute  for  International  Development.  It is  expected  that over  80 countries  will be
included  in  the  survey  encompassing  countries  at  all levels  of  development.  An  earlier version  of  the  World  Business
Environment  Survey, comprising  69 countries,  was carried  out  1996 and presented  in  the World Bank's  World Development
Report 1997 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).  Some of the data from the BEEPS were first published in the EBRD's
Transition  Report  (1999).  For  a  full description  of  the  survey  and  the  main  results,  see  Hellman,  Jones,  Kaufmann  and
Schankerman  (2000).
5Until  recently, most  empirical  studies  of corruption  have  tended  to rely on cross-country  indices  of corruption  based  mostly
upon  the  assessments  of extemal  experts  or  foreign  investors.  Such indicators  did  not  disaggregate  corruption  into  different
forms  and relied  on  generic questions  about  the extent  of corruption.  Without  reliable measures  of state  capture,  as distinct
from  other  forms  of  corruption,  empirical  research  has  concentrated  by  default  on  conventional  forms  of  administrative
corruption,  such  as  bribery  to  get  around  red  tape.  For  an  analysis  of  existing  governance  and  corruption  indicators
worldwide,  see  Kaufmann,  Kraay  and  Zoido-Lobaton  (1999b).  While  world-wide  comparative  indices  are  mostly
unidimensional  proxies  for  corruption,  in-depth  diagnostic  survey  tools  have  been  developed  to  unbundle  corruption  and
measure other governance  dimensions  (World Bank  Institute  and ECSPE,  1999).  However,  these country  specific diagnostics
do not  lend themselves  to cross-county  comparative  indices  for large groups  of countries.4
An  analysis of  the  BEEPS  data  suggests  a  starkly  contrasting  picture  of  the  nature  of
interactions  between  firms  and  the  state across  the  transition  countries.  In  one  group  of
countries, which  we refer  to as capture  economies,  public officials appear  to  have created a
private market  for  the provision  of normally public goods (e.g. the security of property  and
contract  rights)  and  rent-seeking  opportunities  which  a  relatively small share  of  firms can
obtain  either  through  influence  or  state capture.  While  such  advantages  bring  substantial
private gains to the individual firms, they generate significant negative externalities for the rest
of the economy. In the other  group  of countries, this market for concentrated  advantages to
individual firms through  state capture and influence is quite limited, though present.  In these
countties,  capture  appears  to have  few direct benefits  to those  firms who  engage in it while
producing a much more limited impact on the operations of other firms in the economy..
Beyond the variation across the transition economies, we can identify and differentiate among
captorfirms  (i.e. firms that make private payments to public officials to affect the  rules of the
game)  and influential  firms (i.e. firms that  have  influence  on  those  rules without  recourse to
private payments to public officials). We find clear distinctions  between  the profiles  of these
two  groups  of  firms. Influential  firms tend  to be the  classic incumbents  inherited  from the
previous  communist  system. They are generally large, state-owned  firms with  a higher than
average market  share in their own sectors, reasonably secure property rights and close formal
and informal  ties with the state. Captor  firms tend to have the opposite profile: they are likely
to be de  novo 6 private firms with less secure property rights and weaker  ties to the state facing
stronger competitive pressures  from incumbent  firms.
Our analysis suggests that while influence  tends to be inherited from the past -- by particular
state and privatized enterprises -- other firms choose to engage in state capture as a strategy to
compete  against these  influential incumbents.  Captor  firmns  seek to purchase  advantages a la
carte  directly from  the  state, including, but not  limited to, individualized protection  for  their
own property and contract  rights in environments  where  the state continues to under-provide
public goods necessary for effective entry and competition.
Comparing enterprise performance  over time, we find that influential and captor  firms grow at
a substantially faster rate than  other  firms, controlling for country-wide  determinants  and for
other  firn-level  characteristics.  Yet  these  private  gains to  capture  are  only realized in  high
capture economnies,  i.e. where state officials have created a sufficiently extensive private market
for  key under-provided  public  goods  and  other  rent-generating  advantages  and  thus  share
some portion  of the rents associated with  state capture. In contrast,  in  countries  with more
limited levels of state  capture, those  firms that  engage in  state capture perform  worse than
other firms. Starting from a lower level of property rights security, captor firms are also shown
to gain much  greater improvements  in the security of their property  and contract  rights over
t1e,  especially in capture economies.
Despite these substantial private gains to captor and influential firms, we demonstrate  that the
social costs  of capture  and influence  for  all other  firms in  the  transition  economies  can be
considerable. Average firm growth rates are systematically lower  for  firms in high versus low
capture economies,  despite the concentrated  gains to captor  firms. Moreover, the success of
captor  firms in securing individualized protection  for  their property  rights appears to weaken
overall progress  in  strengthening  the  security of property  and  contract  rights  for  all other
6 We  define  de novo  firms  as those  created  without  any  state-owned  predecessor.5
firms. The  private  gains  to  capture  and  influence  seem  to  generate  considerable  negative
externalities for other firms, especially in high capture economies.
Whereas  de novo firms have  been  the  driving  force of growth  and  a major  constituency  for
further structural reforms in the most advanced transition economies, in the capture economy,
these firms have  strong incentives to  engage in state capture in an effort  to compete  against
influential incumbent  firms. This can lead to a potential vicious circle in which a small share of
dynamic firms gain concentrated  advantages that  further  undermine  the state's  provision  of
necessary public goods and weaken economic growth. 7
While  this paper  is empirically-oriented  and  does not  formalize a conceptual  model .of the
complex interaction  between firms and the state, we advance an approach  that moves beyond
the 'grabbing hand'  model, recognizing  the ways in which  firms exert influence  on  the state
and identifying the private and  social costs and benefits associated with different  methods  of
influence.  We also explore the determinants  of state capture, at the firm level focusing on the
initial conditions  faced by the firm (especially security of property rights), and at the country-
wide level emphasizing the progress made in the process of political liberalization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 discusses the BEEPS survey.  Section
3  outlines  the  empirical  approach  to  measuring  corruption,  state  capture  and  influence.
Section 4 examines the micro-level determinants  of these interactions  between  the state and
the firm.  Section  5 considers the private  gains to the firm resulting from  these interactions.
Section 6 discusses the social costs of state capture in terms and firm performance  and section
7  examines  the  link  between  state  capture  and  reduced  security  of  property  rights  that
underlies  the  negative  impact  of  the  capture  economy  on  firm  performance.  Section  8
presents  a  brief  discussion  of  the  origins  of  the  capture  economy  in  terms  of  social and
political liberalization.  Section  9 concludes.  An  appendix presents  some  additional  results
together  with information  on the sample composition  of the BEEPS,  and a summary table of
all the variables used in the empirical analyses.
7For  a multiple  equilibria model  of the unofficial  economy  in  transition  which underscores  the  nexus  between  governance
variables and the provision  (or lack thereof)  of key public  goods, see Johnson,  Kaufmann  and Shleifer (1997).6
2. The Survey
The BEEPS questionnaire  for the transition economies was developed jointly by the World
Bank' and the Office of the Chief Economist at the EBRD. 9 The survey  was conducted on
the basis of face-to-face interviews with high level firm managers or owners in site visits
during the period June through August 1999  in the following  countries: 10
Albania,  Armenia, Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,
Hungary,  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Moldova,  Poland, Romania, the Russian
Federation, the Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan.
In each country, between 125 and 150 firms were interviewed  with the exception of three
countries  where higher samples  were used: Poland (246),  Russia (552)  and Ukraine (247).  The
sample was structured to be fairly representative of the domestic economies with specific
quotas placed on size, sector,  location,  and export orientation.11
By unbundling  forms of influence  and types of corruption  and examining  them from the firm-
level perspective,  the BEEPS provides a number of important advantages.  First, it allows us to
explore whether firms with heterogeneous characteristics  interact differently  with the state.
Second, it provides an opportunity to investigate the types of "services" for which firms
engage the state through bribe payments and influence.  Third, it provides a micro-economic
perspective  on the costs and benefits to firms associated  with different forms of influence and
corruption.  Lastly,  it allows us to investigate the factors that make firms influential and
determine  their propensity  to engage  in different forms of corruption.
8The  team at the World Bank  comprised  Daniel  Kaufmann,  Homi  Kharas,  Syamm Khemani,  Guy Pfefferman,  Andy  Stone
and Geeta Batra.  We are also grateful to Randi Ryterman  for contributing  to the BEEPS  questionnaire.
9The  team at the EBRD  comprised  Steven Fries, Joel  Hellman and Mark  Schankerman.
10 In  all countries  (except Latvia  and Albania)  the  survey was  conducted  by  local staff  of  an international  survey  firm  to
ensure  consistency  of training  and approach  across countries.
I  The  sample was heavily weighted  towards  privately owned  firms, though  there were quotas  for state-owned  firms and firms
with  foreign  ownership.  However,  no  attempt  was made  to  construct  a representative  sample across  these  ownership  strata
and the quotas  were designed only to ensure representation.7
3. Measuring Capture, Corruption and Influence 12
The BEEPS survey includes questions to measure three distinct, but potentially overlapping,
types of interactions  between the firm and the state:" 3
*  administrative  corrmption:  the extent to which firms make illicit and non-transparent private
payments  to  public  officials in  order  to  alter  the  prescribed  implementation  of
administrative  regulations  placed by the state on the firm's activities.
*  state  capture:  the extent to which firms make illicit  and non-transparent private payments to
public officials  in order to influence  the formation of laws, rules, regulations  or decrees by
state institutions.
*  influence:  the extent to  which firms have influence on  the formation of  laws, rules,
regulations and decrees by state institutions without recourse to illicit and non-transparent
private payments to public officials.
The key distinction  between these three types of interactions  is the source of the rents and the
rough distribution of  those  rents  inherent  in  each relationship. Through  administrative
corruption, rents deriving from the discretionary  capacity  of the state to regulate the activities
of firms should accrue primarily  to corrupt public officials.  This is the closest equivalent  to
corruption associated with the "grabbing hand" state. Through state capture, rents deriving
from the capacity of firms to encode private advantages  in the rules of the game as a result of
bribes to public officials are shared by firms and the corrupt officials. Through influence,
rents deriving from the capacity of firms to encode advantages for themselves in the basic
rules of the game as a result of their enhanced leverage  should accrue primarily  to the firm.
Of course, there is considerable scope for overlap across these three types of interactions
between the firm and  the  state and  the exact distribution of  rents cannot be  so neatly
deciphered  in reality. Moreover, some firms are likely  to engage  simultaneously  in all types of
interactions with  the state. Some firms can even avoid such interactions with  the  state
altogether,  though the survey suggests  that such firms are in the rnminority  across the transition
econormies.  Recognizing  the limitations,  the BEEPS survey  was designed  to disentangle  these
interactions to  investigate potential differences in  the roots  and  consequences of  these
relationships  both at the firm level and at the country level.
Administrative  Corruption
12  The  empirical  measures  presented  in  this  section  and  their  graphical  depiction  can  be  downloaded  at
lttp:/fworldbaink.o0-rwwbi/2overnianice.siovdata/capdata.xls.  For  a more detailed  depiction  of the  characteristics  of the
sample and variable characteristics,  see tables Al  and A2 .n the Appendix  of this paper.
13 For  more  detail  on  this  unbundling  of  corruptior  into  separate  and  measurable  components,  see  Heilman,  Jones,
Kaufmann  and Schankerman  (2000).
14  Tfhe concept  of  regulatory  capture,  upon  which  this  concept  is  based,  is  not  limited  to  a  relationship  based  on  illicit
transactions.  Regulations  could  be devised to  the  benefit  of the  regulated  at the  expense  of  social welfare  due a number  of
factors  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  corruption,  such  as  asymmetric  information  or  collective  action  problems.  We  are
interested  in  making  a sharper  distinction  between  capture  as a  form  of  corruption  and  influence.  A  vast  literature  on
regulatory  capture  emerged  from  the work  of Stigler  in the  early seventies,  including  Stigler(1971), Peltzman(1976),  Laffont
and Tirole  (1993), among  others  (see bibliographical  references  for details).  While today's  theory  of regulation  focuses  more
on  the  characteristics  and benefits  of  competition  in a world  of private  sector  involvement  in infrastructure,  in  earlier years
the  emphasis  was  on  the  likelihood  and  costs  of regulatory  capture  in  particular  sectors  (such  as those  regarded  as 'natural
monopohes'  in infrastructure).8
Methods of measuring  and comparing levels of administrative corruption  across countries are
alteady  well-established.  The  BEEPS  survey  follows  the  convention  of  previous  surveys
around  the  world  which  ask firn  managers to  estimate  the propordon  of  annual revenues
typically paid by "firms like yours"  in unofficial  payments to public officials "in  order to get
things  done."'5 The survey stipulates a  range of "services"  for which  such bribes  could be
paid, including connection  to public services, to obtain licenses and permuits,  to deal with taxes
and  tax  collection,  to  deal with  customs/imports.  Table  1 presents  unweighted  country
averages of the cumulative bribes paid by firms in administrative corruption.
Table 1: Measuring Administrative Corruption' 6
Country  Administrative  Standard  error
Corruption+
Albania  4.0  (0.4)
Bulgaria  2.1  (0.4)
Croatia  1.1  (0.2)
Czech Republic  2.5  (0.4)
Estonia  1.6  (0.2)
Hungary  1.7  (0.3)
Latvia  1.4  (0.3)
Lithuania  2.8  (0.5)
Poland  1.6  (0.2)
Romania  3.2  (0.4)
Slovak Republic  2.5  (0.4)
Slovenia  1.4  (0.3)
Average CEE  2.2
Armenia  4.6  (0.7)
Azerbaijan  5.7  (0.7)
Belarus  1.3  (0.4)
Georgia  4.3  (0.6)
Kazakhstan  3.1  (0.5)
Kyrgyzstan  5.3  (0.6)
Moldova  4.0  (0.6)
Russia  2.8  (0.2)
Ukraine  4.4  (0.4)
Uzbekistan  4.4  (0.6)
Average CIS  3.7
Overall (unweighted
average)  3.0
+ Firms were asked, on average, what percent of revenues do firms like yours typically pay
per annum in unofficial payments to public officials?
0%; less than 1%; 1 - 1.99%;  2 - 9.99%; 10 - 12%; 13 -25%;  Over 25%,
The categories were imputed at 0%; 1%; 2%; 6%; 11%; 19%; 25% and the mean calculated.
15 The question was posed in terms of firm revenues rather that profits since estimates of revenues are more reliable. In
addition the question was posed indirectly  in terms of "firms like yours" to reassure  respondents that their responses  would
not be attributable  directly to their firm.  We take total payments  as a proxy for administrative  corruption since evidence  from
the BEEPS suggests  that the majority of bribe payments are for this  purpose.
16  This measure of administrative  corruption differs from the "bribe tax" presented in EBPD (1999), although both werc
based on the BEEPS. The measure  used in this paper includes the responses of all firms, whereas the measure  presented in
EBRD (1999)  presents the average  bribes as a share of revenues,  among firms that reported paying  bribes.9
The  results  suggest  considerable  variation  in  the  level  of  administrative  corruption  across
transition  economies  ranging  from  less  than  2  per  cent  of  annual  revenues  in  a  number  of
Central  European  countries  to  over  5  per  cent  in  some  CIS  countries.  Yet  there  is
considerable  variation  within  each  region  as well. Within  the  CIS,  the  high  regional  average  is
driven  by  the  very  high  levels  of  administrative  corruption  in  the  Caucasus  countries  and
Kyrgyzstan.  Other  CIS countries  fall within  ranges  more  comparable  to Eastern  Europe.
State  capture
Measuring  state  capture  as  a form  of  corruption  distinct  from  the  above  is  more  complex  as
there  are  few  existing  indicators  in  the  empirical  literature  on  corruption.  One  key
measurement  problem  is that  the  extent  to which  a  set  of  state  institutions  is captured  is not
necessarily  a function  of  the  number  of  firms  that  engage  in  state  capture.  In  an  extreme  case,
a  single powerful  monopoly  could  generate  a much  higher  level  of  state  capture  than  a larger
nurnber  of  less powerful  firms  competing  to  buy  off  state  officials.  To  compare  state  capture
across  firms  and  across  countries,  we therefore  need  both  to identify  the  number  of  firms  that
engage  in it and  to  measure  the  extent  of  the  impact  on  all firms  from  the  capture  of  the  state
by a subset  of  those  firms.  Consequently,  we use  two  measures  of  state  capture:  1) an  impact
measnure  of  the  extent  of  the  capture  economy  defined  as  the  share  of  firms  in  each  country
which  report  a  direct  impact  on  their  business  from  the  purchase  of  laws,  decrees  and
regulations  by  firms  through  private  payments  to  public  officials,  and  2)  a  behamioral  measure
that  identifies  captor  firms,  i.e.  those  that  report  having  made  private  payments  to  public
,officials for the  purpose  of influencing  the  contents  of laws,  decrees  or regulations. 17
'ro  construct  an index  of  the  capture  economy,  firmns  were  asked  to assess  the  extent  to which
:he following  six types  of  activities  have  had  a direct  impact  on  their  business:' 8
*  the  sale of Parliamentary  votes  on laws to private  interests;
*  the  sale of Presidential  decrees  to private  interests;
*  Central  Bank  mishandling  of  funds;
*  the  sale of court  decisions  in criminal  cases;
*  the  sale of court  decisions  in cornmercial  cases;
40  illicit contributions  paid  by private  interests  to political  parties  and  election  campaigns.
Table  2 presents  the  percentage  of  firms  in each  country  which  responded  that  the  respective
form  of  state  capture  has  had  a  significant  impact  on  their  business.  By averaging  across  all of
the  categories  an  aggregate  index  of  the  extent  of  the  capture  economy  is presented.
17  7f  course,  the  impact  measure  of  state  capture  is based  on  the  speculation  of  firms  that  other  firms  are  engaging  in
6nproper  behavior  and thus  less reliable than the behavioral measure. The empirical analysis of the effects  of state capture  on
firm-level performance  below  will be based  on  the  more reliable behavioral  measure.  However,  we  believe  that  the impact
measure still provides  a useful relaive  indicator  of perceptions  of the irnpact of state capture across countries.
'T'he decision  to  include  the  sale of  court  decisions  to  private  interests  and  the  mishandling  of  Central  Bank  funds  as
elements  of state capture  requires  some explanation.  Courts  are generally seen as institutions  that  implement  existing laws as
opposed  to  making  them,  though  the  prccedent-setting  function  of  courts  can  blur  these  boundaries.  In  the  transition
countries,  where  legal systems  are still in the  nascent  stages of development,  courts  can be  seen as playing a more formative
role in the development  of the legal framework.  As regards the Central Bank, the institution's  role in  setting monetary  policy
and  creating the regulatory  framework  for  the  developing  financial system  also blurs  the  distinction  between  the  formation
a:nd implementation  of  rules.  While  recognizing  the  difficulty  of  drawing  concrete  boundaries  within  any  particular
institution,  we  have  chosen  to  incorporate  these institutions  within  the  category of  state capture  as a result  of  the  unique
nature  of the  transition  period.  Yet it is important  to note  that  removing  these components  from  the index of state capture
does not  change substantially the ranking of countries  on state capture presented  in table 2.10
The index of the  capture  economy, defined  as the  unweighted average of the  6 component
indices,  suggests a  sharp  division of  the  transition  countries  imto two  groups."  The  low
capture  group  includes:  Albania,  Armenia,  Belarus,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,
Kazakhstan, Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovenia and  Uzbekistan. This is an unusual  combination  of
countries  as it incorporates  the  most  advanced  and  the  least advanced  reformers  on  both
political and  economic  transition  in  the  sample.  It  should  not  be  surprising  that  the  most
advanced reformers  have the lowest levels of state capture as their progress in liberalizing the
economy,  strengthening  bureaucratic  accountability  and  promoting  political  contestability
nmght be expected  to  place some,  albeit stll  imperfect,  constraints  on  the  extent  to which
individual firms can capture  the state.
Table  2: Measuring  the capture  economy  (% of firms affected by  'purchase  of...
Parliamentary Presidential  Central  Criminal Commercial Party  Capture Classification 20
legislation  decrees  Bank  Courts  Courts  Finance Economy
Country  IndexX
Albania  12  7  8  22  20  25  16  Low
Armenia  10  7  14  5  6  1  7  Low
Azerbaijan  41  48  39  44  40  35  41  High
Belarus  9  5  25  0  5  4  8  Low
Bulgaria  28  26  28  28  19  42  28  High
Croatia  18  24  30  29  29  30  27  High
Czech  18  11  12  9  9  6  11  Low
Republic
Estonia  14  7  8  8  8  17  10  Low
Georgia  29  24  32  18  20  21  24  High
Hungary  12  7  8  5  5  4  7  Low
Kazakhstan  13  10  19  14  14  6  12  Low
Kyrgyzstan  18  16  59  26  30  27  29  High
Latvia  40  49  8  21  26  35  30  High
Lithuania  15  7  9  11  14  13  11  Low
Moldova  43  30  40  33  34  42  37  High
Poland  13  10  6  12  18  10  12  Low
Romania  22  20  26  14  17  27  21  High
Russia  35  32  47  24  27  24  32  High
Slovak  20  12  37  29  25  20  24  High
Republic
Slovenia  8  5  4  6  6  11  7  Low
Ukraine  44  37  37  21  26  29  32  High
Uzbekistan  5  4  8  5  9  4  6  Low
Overall  21  18  23  18  18  20  20
(unweighted
average)
* Firms were asked whether corruption in each dimension had no impact; minor impact; significant impact; very
significant impact on their business.  The table reports the proportion of firms reporting significant or very significant
impact of state capture in each dimension.
+  Calculated as the unweighted average of the six component indices.
t9  This division  is not intended to imply that there are no interestng differences  between  the countries  in the two groups but
is rather a simple reflection of a tendency in the data that will be used for framing some of the uncontrolled results in the
paper. Albania  is defined as the borderline  low-capture  country and Romania the borderline high-capture  country.
0 The use of the descriptive term  low' does not imply that state capture does not exist in these countries.  Indeed the
BEEPS shows that the phenomenon is present across the transition economies,  although in those that we describe as 'low'
the impact is significantly  more limited.11
A  prion the low capture index for some of the least advanced reformers,  such as Belarus and
Uzbekistan,  might  appear puzzling. A  likely explanation is that in  such countries the private
sector  remains  small, imnportant elements of the  command  system are still in  operation,  and
the  political regimes  are  highly authoritarian.  In  countries  with  such  a  severe imbalance
between  the  power  of  the  state and  the  private  sector,  the  extent  of state  capture  by  the
private sector  can only be minimal  (and indeed the  concept  may have  little meaning  in  this
context).
The gap  separating countries with a low and  high state capture index is considerable. In the
high  capture  econornies,  more  than  a quarter  of  the  firms surveyed  reported  a  significant
impact of  state capture  on  their business. This group  includes: Azerbaijan,  Bulgaria, Croatia,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine.  Most of these
countries could be considered partial reformers  both in terms of their political and econornic
transitions.  They have generally made significant advances in liberalization  and privatization
with  much  less progress  in concomitant  institutional  reforms  to  support  a proper  legal and
regulatory  framework.  Though  most  have  adopted  the basic rules  of democratic  elections,
there remain concerns  in nearly all of these countries regarding the concentration  of political
power  and  linitations  on  political competition.  Capture  might  be  expected  to  thrive in an
environment  of  partial  econornic  reformns and  concentrated  political  power,  though  the
determinants  of the capture economy will be addressed in greater detail below. 21
In contrast  to  this  impact  measure  of the  extent  of  state capture,  the  BEEPS  survey also
attempted  to elicit whether  firms directly engaged in making illicit private payments to public
officials to  influence  the  content  of laws, decrees  or regulations.  This allows us  to  identify
captorfirms  and contrast  their characteristics and performance with other firms both within and
across countries. 22 Table 3 lists the share of all firns  in each country  that can be classified as
captor  firms.  As  expected,  captor  firms  are  a minority  in  all countries,  though  again  the
variation is considerable across the transition countries.
Influence
The measure of influence is based on  the firm's own assessment of their capacity to affect the
content  of laws,  rules, regulations  or  decrees  emanating  from  various  state institutions  that
would have a substantial impact  on  their business.'  The question made  no  reference  to any
21  On the links between partial reforms and the capacity  of powerful firms to concentrate gains as a result of the associated
market distortions,  see Hellman (1998).
22  The captor firms were identified on the basis of the following  question: "How often do firms like yours nowadays  need to
make extra, unofficial payments to public officials to influence the content of new laws, decrees and regulations?". Firms
responding  sometimes or more frequently  were classified  as captors. As discussed above, there is no theoretical reason to
believe  that the behavioral measure of state capture, constructed as the share of firms engaging  in this activity, should be
necessarily  related in any systematic  manner to the impact measure, constructed as the share of firms that have been direcdy
affected. However a sirnple correlation of the two measures reveals a correlation coefficient of 0.69, which lends some
additional confidence to the measurement of  state capture as used in this paper.  Nevertheless, the less than perfect
correlation  between the two measures is consistent with the observation that the nature of state capture varies from country
to country and thus there is a variance in the cross-country  0ennMesfn  of  cahm,  defined as the ratio of the capture economy
index  to the proportion of captor firms (ie. the economy-wide  state capture impact per captor firm).  The calculated  measure
of concentration  of capture is presented in the appendix table A3 and will  be analyzed  further in forthcoming  research.
23  The influential  firms were identified  on the basis of the following  question: "When a new law, rule regulation of decree is
being discussed that could have a substantial impact on your business, how much influence does your firm typically  have at
the national level of government to try to influence the content of that law, rule regulation or decree?" The question was12
private payments to public officials  or other explicit forms of corruption. Firms that reported
some influence or more on any of the branches of government listed - executive,  legislature,
ministries or regulatory agencies  - were classified  as influential.  The share of influential firms
as a percentage  of the sample in each country is listed in Table 3. Influential  firms make up a
small minority of firms in every transition country,  though there is still considerable  variation
across countries.
One might expect some overlap between state capture and influence  as both represent efforts
to  shape the  content  of the  legal and  regulatory framework, although through different
methods. However, a cross-tabulation  of captor firms and influential firms across the entire
sample reveals surprisingly little overlap.  Of the 343 captor and  influential firms .in the
sample, only 21 firms report that they engage  in both state capture and have influence  on the
formation of state policies. This suggests  that capture and influence are alternative strategies
of interacting  with the state for a small share of firms with the capacity  to have an impact on
shaping the legal and regulatory  environment.
Table  3: Captor  and  Influential  firms
Captors  Influential
Country  (% of sample)  (% of sample)
Albania  11  4
Armenia  7  3
Azerbaijan  24  1
Belarus  2  5
Bulgaria  11  8
Croatia  10  12
Czech  Republic  7  8
Estonia  5  11
Georgia  8  8
Hungary  4  3
Kazakhstan  6  4
Kyrgyzstan  7  7
Latvia  14  14
Lithuania  14  5
Moldova  12  14
Poland  9  3
Romania  13  9
Russia  9  7
Slovak  Republic  12  4
Slovenia  10  3
Ukraine  12  14
Uzbekistan  2  4
Overall  (unweighted  9  7
average)
asked separately  for the executive,  legislative,  ministry  and regulatory  branches of government. A firm  that reported influence
in any of these branches was classified  as influential.13
4. The determinants  of capture, corruption and influence
What  factors affect the propensity of firms to enter  into these different  types of relationships
with the state?  To what extent are these choices determined  by charactenstics  of the firm or
features of the broader  political economy environment? By investigating the different profiles
of firms that  engage in  state capture  and  influence, we might  gain insights into how  these
relationships with the state differ.
Econometric  Results
We present  the results  of  separate  regressions to  explore  the  characteristics  that  affect  the
propensity of any given firm to engage in administrative corruption, state capture or influence,
as defined above.  Controlling  for country fixed effects, we examine the impact  of the  firm's
size,  origins, market  power,  bureaucratic  recourse,  and  security of  property  and  contract
rights.
Si,e:i' Larger firms would be expected to wield greater influence and be more likely to engage
m  state  capture  as  they  have  more  bargaining  power  with  the  state  and  control  more
resources. Smaller firms, in contrast,  might be more vulnerable  to the grabbing hand  of the
state and thus more likely to be targets of administrative corruption.
Qnftns.. 25 The  ownership  and  origins of the  firm - i.e. state-owned,  privatized  or de novo  -
determine, to some extent, the formal ties between the firm and the state as well as the extent
of  repeated  interactions  between  firm  managers  and  public  officials.  State-owned  and
privatized  firms  might  be  expected  to  retain  considerable  access  to  and  ties with  public
officials, enhancing their influence  on the state.  As new players on  the market, de novo  firms,
in contrast,  are less likely to be influential, while possibly more likely to invest in state capture
as a  substitute  for  more  formal  ties  of  influence  to  the  state.  Such  firms might  also be
expected to pay higher levels of administrative corruption.
Market  pover.2 6 Firms with greater market power would be expected to be more influential and
more  likely to  engage in  state  capture,  though  it  is  difficult  to  separate  the  direction  of
causality since influence  and capture are also likely to enhance  the  firm's market power. 27 In
the BEEPS  survey, market  power  is measured  by the  inelasticity of demand  for  the  firm's
:major  product  line. Respondents were asked to state the likely response  of their customers  to
a  significant price increase in their main product line.  Firmns  with less market power are more
likely to be subjected to demands for bribes in the context of administrative corruption.
Firms were divided into small,  medium  and kge  based  on the number of employees.  Small firms had less than  50 employees,
medium  sizcd firms had between  50 and 500 and large firms were those with  more than  500.
25  Firms were divided  into  de novo,  puivatiZed  and state owned  De  novo  firms are those  which were private  from  the time  of
start-up  with no state-owned  predecessor,  privatized  firms are those which were formnerly  state owned  and state owned  firms
are those in which the state retains  majority ownership.
26 Firms were asked, "if you were to raise your prices of your main product  line 10%  /above  their current  level (after allowing
for  any inflation  and assuming  that  your competitors  maintained  their  current  prices), which  of  the  following  would  best
clescribe the result?  Many of our customers  would  buy from our  competitors  instead  (I);  Our  customers would  continue  to
buy from us, but  at much lower  quantities  (2); Customers  would  continue  to buy from us, but  at slightly lower quantities  (3);
Customers  would continue  to buy from us in the same quantities  as now (4).
27 In addition, we include  this variable since its exclusion potentially  biases the coefficient  of  the insecurity of property  rights
X  ariable.14
Bureaucratic  recourse.,"  Some firms have better  access to public officials than others  and can use
that access to ensure fair treatment  against transgressions. The BEEPS  survey asked firms to
assess whether,  if some  public official acts against the  rules, they can go  to  another  public
official to get fair treatment without recourse to private payments to that public official. Firms
that  have  sufficient  access  to  defend  themselves  against  such  transgressions  could  be
described as having greater bureaucratic recourse. Bureaucratic recourse should be expected to
be positively associated with greater influence.  Firms that  engage in state capture might be
expected to have lower levels of bureaucratic recourse as their interactions with public officials
tend  to  be based  on  private payments.  Firms with less bureaucratic  recourse  should also be
more prone  to administrative corruption.
Insecuriy  ofproperty  and contract  rights9 Firms with insecure property  rights, especially  as a result
of  discretionary  interventions  in  their  affairs  by  bureaucrats,  might  be  tempted  to  seek
individualized protection  through  state capture. In contrast, firms with more  secure property
rights rmight be  expected  to  wield greater  influence  on  the  state,  given  their  longer  time
horizon  and greater leverage over the state. The  survey asked firms to evaluate the security of
their property  and  contract  rights both  today and  three  years ago  to  examine changes over
time. In the regressions reported  below we use the insecurity of such rights three years ago as
proxy for the firn's  "initial conditions".
Table  4  presents  the  econometric  evidence on  the  determinants  of  influence, capture  and
administrative  corruption.  Country  fixed effects are included in  each regression though  the
results are not  shown.  Comparing  the results across  the regressions  confirms  that  different
types  of  firms  in  transition  economies  have  incentives  to  enter  into  different  types  of
relationships with the state.
As expected, larger firms with their greater command  over resources  are more  likely both  to
have influence  on  the state and  to engage in state capture, but  pay less bribes  as a share of
their  annual  revenues  for  administrative  corruption  than  small  firms.  Large  firms would
appear  to have  a wider  range of options  in their interactions  with the  state.  Administrative
corruption,  in contrast, is highly regressive having the greatest impact  on small firms. 30
2  Firms were asked, "How  often  is the following  statement  true?  If  a government  agent  acts against the  rules I can usually
go  to  another  official  or to  his  superior  and get  the correct  treatment  without  recourse  to  unofficial  payments."  Never  (I);
Seldom (2); Sometimes  (3); Frequently  (4); Mosdy (5); Always (6).
29 Firms were asked  "To  what degree  do  you agree with  this  statement,  now  and three  years ago?  I am  confident  that  the
legal system  will uphold  my  contract  and  property  rights  in  business  disputes"  Always  (1); Mostly  (2); Frequently  (3);
Sometimes (4); Seldom (5); Never  (6).
On the regressive nature  of bribery  see EBRD  (2000).15
The effects of the firm's origins on the nature of its relationship  with the state show an
interesting  pattern. Again as expected,  state-owned  firms are more likely  to be influential  than
either ptivatized or de  novo  firms, perhaps as a result of their stronger formal ties to the state,
legacies  of previous state ownership  and more frequent  interactions  with public officials.  In
sharp contrast, captor firms are more likely  to be de  novo  firms or privatized  firms (though this
latter variable  is only borderline significant).  Similarly,  ie now  firms pay higher  levels  of
administrative  corruption than either state firms or privatized  firns. New entrants are thus
more likely  to engage  in corruption, though larger  new entrants are more likely  to engage  in
state capture, while smaller  new entrants face  greater administrative  corruption.
Table 4: The determinants of state capture, administrative corruption and influence
Independent  variables  Dependent  variables
Category  Sub-category  Administrative  Influence  State  Capture
(Dummy  variable  Corruption
base  category  in
parentheses)
Origin  De  Novo  0.009**  -0.143**  0.392**
(2.43)  (-2.42)  (3.43)
Privatized  0.005  -0.11 **  0.173
(1.44)  (-2.06)  (1.58)
(State  Owned)
Size  Small  0.014**  -0.356**  -0.382**
(3.26)  (4.87)  (-2.89)
Medium  0.003  -0.241**  -0.283**
(0.77)  (-3.72)  (-2.41)
(Large)
Insecurity of property and  0.006**  -0.025*  0.082**
contract  rights  (6.76)  (-1.82)  (3.08)
Market  power  0.000  0.042**  0.015
(0.16)  (2.52)  (0.46)
Bureaucratic  -0.006**  0.025**  0.1  17**
Recourse  (-8.43)  (2.22)  (-5.2)
N  1902  1697  2030
R 2 0.19  0.15  -
Pseudo R 2
- - 0.06
Econometric  model  OLS  OLS  Ordered  Probit
Country  dummies  were  included  but  not  reported
**  significant  at  5%  level;  * significant  at 10%  level.  t-statistics  in parentheses.
Market power, as measured by the inelasticity  of demand for the firm's major product line
does increase its influence,  while having  no significant  impact on the propensity to engage  in
state capture or on the levels of administrative  corruption paid by the firm. Thus, firms with
limited competition can turn  their market power into influence over the  state without16
necessarily  resorting to various forms of state capture." Similarly,  firms with greater access  to
public officials, or what we tefer to as bureaucratic recourse, are also more likely to have
greater influence. By contrast, it is precisely those firms that lack access to public officials
who can protect them against transgressions  by other officials  that tend to engage in state
capture, arguably  as a defensive strategy  to purchase protection from other public officials.
Lower bureaucratic  recourse also increases  bribes for administrative  corruption.
Finally,  the results on the insecurity  of property rights follow the same pattern of variation
across different types of relationships  with the state. State capture appears  to be a strategy  of
firms  which started with less secure  property and contract rights than influential  firms. 32 Such
msecurity  also incteases  their exposure  to administrative  corruption.
The different profiles  of influential  and captor firms are striking.  Influential  firms appear  to be
the classic  incumbent firms inherited ftom the socialist  system. They are large, usually  state-
owned with good access  to public officials  and a dominant position  in their own market.  They
began the transition from a more secure position with a much higher degree of security  of
property and contract rights. Captor firms, in contrast, tend to be larger  new entrants to the
market with weaker formal ownership  ties to the state and less access  to public officials.  They
begin the transition with less secure property and contract rights and do not have as strong a
position in their markets as the influential  incumbent  firms.
Furthermore, the captor firms also report greater barriers to competition than influential
firms. Table 5 compares the share of captor, influential and other firms that perceive  anti-
competitive  barriers as a significant  obstade to their business.  Across the sample,  captor firms
face a greater threat of anti-competitive  barriers.  The difference  is particularly  stark when we
compare the perceptions of captor firms in low and high capture economies 
3
31We  also  added  a variable  measuring  the  firm's  market  share  in  its  dominant  product  line but  these  results  were not
significant in any of the regressions.
32  To  assert that  the initial security of property  rights are also a cause of influence  is clearly implausible, but  for  symmetry we
indude  this variable as a control  in the  determinarits  of influence.  Our  hypothesis  is that  a high  level of 'initial influence'
would  be a cause  of security  of property  tights  in future  periods,  but unfortunately  we do not have  the variables  to test  this
and the results are merely suggestive of the relationship between  influence and the security of property  rights.
33 Captor  firms  also  report  somewhat  lower  levels  of market  share  than  other  firms  in the sample.17
Table  5: Anti-competitive  Barriers
% of firms that report anti-  Low Capture Countries High Capture Countries
competitive barriers+
Captor firms  0.46  0.73
(0.05)  (0.03)
Influential firms  0.32  0.56
(0.06)  (0.04)
Other  0.38  0.51
(0.01)  (0.01)
Standard errors in parentheses
Firms were asked how problematic  are anti-competitive  practices by the
govermnent or private enterprises? No obstacle;  Minor obstacle; Moderate
Obstacle; Major Obstacle. Firms reporting moderate or major obstacles are
classified as facing anti-competitive  barriers.
Though  it mnight be  assumed  that  firms  invest  in state  capture  to extract  rents  ftom  the  state  as
a  substitute  for innovation  in  the  market,  the  evidence  suggests  instead  that  state  capture  and
econornic  innovation  are  complementary,  at least  in high  capture  states.  Table  6 compares  the
propensity  of  captor  firns  versus  other  firns  to  engage  in  such  innovative  activities  as
opening  new  plants  and  developing  new  products.  In  high  capture  economies,  captor  firms
are  significantly  more  likely to innovate.34 Yet  there  is a clear  distinction  between  the  behavior
of  captor  firms in low  and  high  capture  economies.
Table 6: Market  Innovation
Opened  new  plants  Developed  new products
(%  of firms)  (% of firms)
Low  Capture  Countries
Captor Firms  0.17  0.31
(0.04)  (0.05)
Influential Firms  0.27  0.27
(0.06)  (0.06)
Other Firms  0.19  0.31
(0.01)  (0.01)
High Capture Countries
Captor Firms  0.31  0.36
(0.03)  (0.04)
Influential Firms  0.27  0.42
(0.04)  (0.04)
Other Firms  0.21  0.29
(0.01)  (0.01)
Standard errors in parentheses.
34  However,  if we  further  divide the population  of  captor  firms into de  nave  captors  and captors  derived  from state firms, we
see that the propensity  to innovate  is substantially higher in the former  than the latter.18
These  results  suggest that  state capture  is a  strategy adopted  by  a  small share of relatively
dynamic de novo  firms entering  a market in which they face serious competitive  barriers from
influential incumbent  firms. Given  the  conventional  portrayal  of so-called "oligarchs"  who
buy  off  state  officials  to  extract  rents,  one  might  expect  captor  firms  to  report  fewer
competitive  barriers. Part  of an explanation of this anomaly lies in the particular structute  of
the BEEPS  sample which is weighted towards small and medium sized enterprises. Therefore
the captor firms being sampled are also biased towards smaller and medium sized enterprises.
In addition,  the large enterprises sampled were weighted towards state-owned firms, which as
shown above, are more likely to be influential rather than captor firms.  As a result, the sample
contained  only  a  small  share  of  firms  that  might  be  characterized  as  part  of  the .typical
oligarch's business  group.  This  selection bias  underestimates  the  share  of  large  firms that
might be expected to engage in state capture, which would also be more likely to erect barriers
to entry than face barriers to entry.
There  is a high  share of small and medium sized enterprises  among  the captor  firms in the
BEEPS  sample which suggests that state capture is not a strategy used exclusively by powerful
oligarchs, but  is  more  pervasive  across  different  levels  of  the  economy  and  the  state in
transition  countries."  Indeed,  the  captor  firms  in  the  BEEPS  sample  might  be  more
appropriately  seen as "embryonic  oligarchs," i.e., new firms that are engaging in state capture
as a strategy of entry in an effort  to establish their own  dominance in the  face of influential
incumbent  firms. 36 The  fact that in  high capture  economies  such embryonic  oligarchs also
appear to be among  the most dynamic new firms in the might explain why, once entrenched,
state capture is so difficult to remedy.
35 The  question  remains  as to  what  level of government  or types  of government  decisions  these  smaller  firms are actually
capturing.  In the  transition  economies,  many regulations  with  direct  impact  on  firms  are not  made  at the  highest  levels of
government,  but  are in  the purview  of local officials, who  may be  subject to  capture  from  smaler  firms.  (The  fallacy that
state capture  only applies to the largest  firms at the highest levels of govemment  is similar to  the fallacy that  monopoly power
is  related  to  the  size of  the  firm  or  market  it operates  in.  Even  if  the  relevant  market  is  small,  monopoly  power  can
nevertheless  exist.  Tirole  (1988) gives  the example  of a single  doctor  with  a rural practice.  In  the  same way the  relevant
market  for state capture and influence may be at the national  or local level, all that is required  is for  some  state official to have
the  power  to influence  the operating  environment  of the firm and its competitors.)  If we  assume that  the  smaUer firms that
engage in capture do  so at lower  levels of government,  the results are not  implausible.  Unfortunately  it is not  possible  to test
this assumption.  (and indeed,  this  assumption  also suggests another  interpretation  if we assume  that  firms are more likely to
admit to lower level forms  of corruption).
36 In  addition, it has been  common  practice  in the  transition  economies  for managers  of large firms  to register  de  novo  firms
on the basis of their existing  enterprises,  as a means of diverting assets and reducing  transparency.  As a result, many  small, de
novo firms may actually be linked to  much larger firms.19
5. The private  gains to capture, corruption  and influence
If these alternative  relationships  between  the firm and the state entail different distributions  of
rents, then we should see differential effects on  firm performance associated with these
relationships.  The BEEPS survey  ptovides the first opportunity to measure and compare the
costs and  benefits  to  those  firms that  actively engage in  state  capture, adrninistrative
corruption and influence,  as well  as the externalities  to other firms in each country that are not
engaged in such relationships. As a result,  we can assess  both the private and the social  costs
and benefits of different types of interactions  between firms and the state.
As  suggested above, measuring firm performance in  transition economies is particularly
difficult given the incentives for firms to under-report profits and the lack of international
accounting standards in most countries of the region. Moreover, as a result of well-known
corporate governance  problems, managers  mnight  be able to extract  private gains as a result of
corrupt activities that would not be reflected in the firm level performance. 37 Such pnrvate
gains to managers cannot be measured.  As a proxy of for firm performance, we use actual
and expected future real growth in sales and investment, though the inherent liritations  of
these measures  should be kept in mind.
To illustrate the performance differences,  we first compare the unconditional means of the
actual  growth of sales and  investmnent  over the past three years  between firms that engage  in
state capture, influence  and administrative  corruption and all other firms. We also include data
on expected growth in these variables over the next three years to determine whether any
costs or benefits  on previous performance  are perceived  to be sustainable  in the future. Table
7 compares  the unconditional  performance  means for captor firms, influential  firms and firms
subject to administrative  corruption.
On average,  captor firms demonstrate  a considerably  higher rate of real sales growth over the
past three years than other firms, as well as higher rates of investment and employment.  State
capture does appear to yield private benefits to  the firmn.  It is interesting to note that the
extent of their advantage over other firmns  recedes in expected  performnance  suggesting  some
uancertainty  about the gains to capture over time.
Yet the gains to  state capture would appear to be highly dependent on the nature of the
broader environtnent  in which they operate. If we divide the transition  countries into high and
low capture economies according to  their scores on  the capture economy index defined
above, the pattern of gains to capture looks rather different. Where there is a significant
market for state capture, i.e. where the state is willing  to sell customized packages of public
goods and legislation  to individual  firms, the gains to those firms actively  engaging  in capture
would appear to be substantial. Captor firms grew nearly four times as fast as other firms in
high capture environments  with similarly  substantial  differences  in investment  levels.  Though,
again, the gap between captors and other firnms  narrows considerably on perceptions of
expected  growth rates.
In sharp contrast, captor firmns  in low capture countries,  where states provide a broader range
of public goods for the market arid the legislative  process is more subject to institutional
37  These  corporate  governance  problems  have been investigated  recently by Black et al (1999).  To  the extent  that  growth in
sales represent  gains that accrue to the firm, whether or not they are subsequently  appropriated by managers,  the results of
this  paper  can  be considered  despite  rather  than because  of corruption  for the  private  benefit  of managers.20
restraints and political competition,  exhibit worse  sales growth than  other  firms despite similar
investment  and  employmnent levels. Moreover,  captor  firms in  such  countries  expect  their
lower  growth  rates  to  be  maintained  over  time  as  they  invest  less  and  support  a  lower
employment  rate.  The  gains  to  state  capture  would  appear  to  depend  not  only  on
characteristics of the firm, but of the state as well.
Table 7 also suggests a rough  indication of the negative externalities to all other firms in these
economies  deriving from the practice of state capture.  The average rate of sales growth for all
firms in high capture countries is only 11.1 percent  compared to 21.4 percent  in low capture
countries,  despite  the  specific  gains  enjoyed  by  the  captor  firms.  The  growth  rate  of
investment  shows  a  similar  pattern.  A  full assessment  of  the  social  costs  of  capture  is
presented in a later section.
Table 7: Firm Performance and interactions  with the state (uncontrolled means)
Firm Performance  (unweighted means)
Actual  real  growth  last  three  years  Expected  real  growth  next  three  years
(per  cent)  (per  cent)
Sales  Investment  Sales  Investment
All Countries
Captor  24.5  (5.3)  22.6  (5.8)  24.4  (3.2)  19.9  (3.6)
NonCaptor  14.5  (1.4)  14.6  (1.4)  25.3  (1.1)  16.8  (1.0)
Overall  15.6  (1.2)  15.6  (1.2)  24.6  (0.9)  16.9  (0.9)
Capture  Economies
Captor  31.1  (7.0)  23.0  (7.8)  29.6  (4.4)  25.7  (5.1)
NonCaptor  8.3  (1.6)  9.4  (1.7)  26.7  (1.6)  17.5  (1.3)
Overall  11.1  (1.5)  11.5  (1.6)  25.1  (1.3)  16.8  (I.1)
Non-Capture  Economies
Captor  13.0  (6.6)  21.8  (7.3)  15.7  (3.2)  10.1  (3.5)
Non Captor  20.9  (2.3)  20.0  (2.3)  23.8  (1.6)  16.1  (1.5)
Overall  21.4  (2.0)  21.1  (1.9)  24.1  (1.3)  17.0  (1.3)
All Countries
Influential  32.3  (6.9)  28.4  (7.2)  35.4  (4.9)  23.2  (3.8)
Non Influential  14.9  (1.4)  15.0  (1.4)  25.6  (1.1)  17.7  (1.0)
Overall  15.6  (1.2)  15.6  (1.2)  24.6  (0.9)  16.9  (0.9)
All Countries
High Bribe Firms  11.2  (2.5)  10.2  (2.3)  25.8  (2.2)  17.9  (1.8)
Low Bribe Firms  17.3  (1.7)  17.4  (1.8)  23.4  (1.1)  17.0  (1.2)
Overall  15.6  (1.2)  15.6  (1.2)  24.6  (0.9)  16.9  (0.9)
Standard  errors  in parentheses
There  would  also appear  to be positive  gains to firm  performance  deriving  from influence.
Influential  firms show stronger  performance  across all of the  dimensions  measured  and, in
contrast to captor firms, they expect these advantages to be maintained  over time. 38 Influential
firms seem to do better  across the board, as mnight  be expected.
The  gains  to  capture  and  influence  at  the  firm  level  differ  ftom  the  consequences  of
administrative  corruption  associated  with  the  "grabbing  hand"  approach.  The  firms  are
divided into high and low bribe firms based on  their average reported  level of bribes to public
38 The relative  gains  to influence  do not appear to be affected by the incidence  of capture at the country level.21
officials "to  get things  done." 39 While payments  to influence  the  formation  of  the legal and
regulatory framework  appear to generate substantial gains to the firm, other  forms of bribery
would appear  to  weaken  firm  performance.  Across  the  entire  sample,  firms that  pay  high
levels of administrative  corruption  have grown at a significantly slower pace than  other  firmns.
Investment  levels  in  these  high  bribe  firns  are  substantially  lower  as well.  This  form  of
corruption  would  appear at  first blush  to impose  considerable  costs  to the  firm without  any
measurable benefits  as the grabbing hand model would suggest.
An examination of the unconditional  performance  means suggests that unbundling corruption
reveals important  differences  in  the  consequences  of  different  forms  of  corruption  on  the
firm. Although  the characteristics  of firms that engage in state capture  or have  influence  on
the state are quite different,  both  forms of interaction  with the state would appear to generate
significant rents  to the  firm. By contrast,  firms engaged in  administrative  corruption  do  not
appear to get advantages  from  their bribe payments.  Yet an analysis of the  consequences  of
these different  forms of interaction  with the state must control  for other  characteristics of the
firm that might affect performance  levels.
Econometric  Results
We now estimate  the effects on  firm performance  of all three  different  relationships with the
state - capture,  influence  and  administrative  corruption  - conditioned  upon  country  fixed
effects  and  a  wide  range  of  firm-level  characteristics,  including  sector,  size,  origins,  and
investmnent of foreign  capital in the  firm. We  also control  for two  other  factors  that  should
have  an  impact  on  firm  performance,  namely  innovation and  market power. Not  only  should
innovation  affect  firm  performance  directly,  but  given  the  correlation  of  capture  and
innovation,  is  included  to  avoid  omitted  variable bias  in  the  interpretation  of  the  capture
coefficients.  Likewise, we include market  power,  since  this variable potentially  affects firm
performance  directly and  indirectly through  its correlation  with  influence.  Innovation  is a
dummy variable measuring  whether  the firm has developed  a new product  or opened  a new
plant  within  the  past  three  years.  Market  power  is measured,  as described  above,  by  the
inelasticity of demand  for the firm's major product  as determined  by the firm's perceptions  of
the  actions  of their customers  in  the event  of an 10 percent  price  increase. The  dependent
variables for the firmn  performance  regressions are the average real rate of sales and investment
growth over  the previous  three years and expected rate  of sales and  investment  growth  over
the next three years. Table 8 presents  the regression results.
39  Firms  were classified  as high  bribe  firms  if they reported  spending  over 2% of their annual  revenues  on administrative
corruption.  Firms  spending  less than  or equal  to 
2%  of their  annual  revenues  were  classified  as low  bribe  firms.  Similar
results  were found  using  different  thresholds  to  divide the  finrs  into  categories, which  we do  not  report.  In the  controlled
regressions,  the  full continuous  measure of administrative  corruption  was used to avoid the need  to choose  a threshold.22
Table 8: Firm performance and interactions with the state 40
Independent  variables  Dependent  variables
Sub-category  Real  growth  rate  of:
(Dummy  variable  Sales  Sales  Investment  Investment
base category  in  (previous  3 years)  (next  3 years) (previous  3 years)  (next  3 years)
Category  parentheses)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Sector  Mining  -2.3  -3.9  -12.3  -4.5
(-0.12)  (-0.28)  (-0.63)  (-0.34)
Services  5.9  -1.2  . 6.8*  4.3
(1.48)  (-0.41)  (1.63)  (1.55)
(Manufacturing)
Origin  De Novo  24.4**  13.4**  24.9**  4.0
(4.02)  (3.06)  (3.9)  (0.94)
Privatized  1.5  3.0  11.2**  -0.6
(0.27)  (0.75)  (1.94)  (-0.15)
(State owned)
Size  Small  -15.3**  0.0  -1.9  6.9
(-1.99)  (0.00)  (-0.24)  (1.26)
Medium  -7.9  -1.5  1.1  3.0
(-1.21)  (-0.31)  (0.16)  (0.64)
(Large)
FDI  7.5  9.8**  15.4**  1.7
(1.34)  (2.44)  (2.63)  (0.44)
Innovation  23.3**  14.1**  18.5**  11.  I *
(5.87)  (4.92)  (4.43)  (3.98)
Market  power  2.9*  3.3**  0.4  1.9
(1.63)  (2.58)  (0.20)  (1.53)
Captor  Firm  -23.2*  -13.6  -3.2  -6.8
(-1.61)  (-1.29)  (-0.21)  (-0.68)
Interaction with the  119.9**  40.1  42.4  26.8
capture economy  (2.18)  (1.00)  (0.74)  (0.70)
Influential  Firm  12.7*  7.1  22.2**  1.8
(1.83)  (1.40)  (3.06)  (0.37)
Administrative  corruption  -0.8*  -0.3  -0.4  -0.2
(-1.85)  (-1.13)  (-0.85)  (-0.52)
N  1617  1591  1612  1591
R'  0.11  0.09  0.09  0.05
Econometric  model  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS
Country dummies included, but not reported
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
40  The estimated equation was:
Performance = oa  + PiMining  + P2Services  + P3Smafl  + A4viedium  +  isDe Novo + P6Privatised  +  P7FDI +  8 Innovation +
Po  Market Power +  asoCapture  + PuCapture x Capture Economy Index + P2Influential + P,zAdministrative  Corruption +
(country dummies) + u23
Though dummy variables designating  key sectors do not indicate a significant  impact on firm
performance, the size and origins of firms do matter for sales growth.  Surprisingly,  small
firms have lower sales growth than either medium- or large-scale  firms, though the difference
does not holds in expectations  for future sales  growth. 4" De novo  firns, on the other hand, have
significantly  higher rates of sales  growth than other firms over the past three years and higher
expected sales  as well. 42 It is interesting  to note that privatized firms have not exhibited  higher
sales growth  than  firms  remaining under  state  ownership. 43 Firms  with  foreign direct
investment have also not  shown significantly  higher growth rates than domestically  owned
firms, though they do anticipate  higher expected  sales over the next three years.
*The  two variables that indicate the firm's behavior in the market, namely whether they are
innovators or monopolists, do have a significant  impact on performance.  Innovative firms
show highly positive and significant  gains in actual and expected performance. Firms with
stronger market power also demonstrate positive, though somewhat less significant,  gains in
sales growth.
To investigate the effects of altemative relationships between the firm and the state, we
include dummy  variables for both captor firms and for influential  firms. The captor dummy is
also interacted with the index of the capture economy to measure the extent to which the
gains to the captor firm depend upon the overall extent of state capture in the economy. The
coefficients of the interaction variable represent the additional  impact of  capture on  firm
performance  as the level of state capture in the economy  increases.
'The impact of state capture on sales growth for those firms that actively engage in it are
markedly  different in high capture versus low capture economies. Captor firms grow less  than
other firms in low capture economies, though the coefficient is only marginally  significant.
However, as the extent to which the state has been captured increases, the private gains to
captor firms in terms of sales growth increase substantially.  Capturing the state does generate
gains for the firm, but only in those countries  where state capture has reached some threshold
level in terms of its impact on all firms throughout the economy.
It is interesting  to note that the gains in terms of sales growth to captor firms relative to other
firms are not linked with higher actual  or expected  levels of investment or employment.  While
captor firms have managed to extract advantages  from the state to increase sales in the short
term, this has not generated increased investment in such firms. Moreover, the firms remain
uncertain  as to whether the advantages  in terms of sales growth will  be maintained over time.
I[nfluential  firms also show positive, though less significant,  performance gains in terms of
sales growth. In contrast to  captor firms, influential firms are also more likely to increase
investment  growth.
-1  However,  it  is conceivable  that  small  firms  have  greater  incentives  to  under-report  their  income  so  as not  to  attract  any
anduc  attention  from  the  state or organized  crime.  While larger firms might  have  similar incentives,  small  firms may be less
likely  to be detected and thus more likely  to under-report.
-12 lThe  impact of different forms of ownership and control were also tested in separate specifications  of the model, but did
not  have any statistically significant effects.
43 For  a further  discussion  of the inconsequential  impact  of privatization  on  firm performance  using  BEEPS  data, see I .BR1)
(1999), chapters  8 and 9.24
Controlling for country fixed effects, characteristics of the firm and its behavior in the market,
capture and  influence  both  continue  to yield gains to  those  firms that  can enter  into  such
relationships with  the state. Though influence  enhances performance  across the sample, the
gains to capture are available only in the high capture econornies.
In comparison  with  the private gains to influence  and capture, the impact  of administrative
corruption  contrasts  sharply. The  variable measuring  overall bribe  payments  to  affect  the
implementation of laws, regulations and decrees has a very small negative impact on firm level
growth rates. There  do  not appear to be  any firm-specific benefits in terms  of performance
associated with administrative corruption.
Endogenei_*  and  Instrumentin,g
A possible objection  could be raised regarding simultaneity in these results. It might be argued
that public officials target high-growth firms for "tribute"  payments by threatening them with
the introduction  of unfavorable  legislation, regulations and  decrees.  This would suggest that
high growth rates  are  the real cause of state capture  at the  firm level.  If  so, state  capture
would not be a strategy by which firms extract rents from the state through  shaping laws and
regulations in their favor, but just another  form of high-level extortion by the state, albeit one
that tends to be directed at high-growth firms. Similarly, high growth could also be seen as a
cause of a firm's influence over the state. If high growth were the cause of both  state capture
and influence, we would expect  to see greater overlap between capture  and influence  at the
firm  level as such  growth would  simultaneously enhance  influence  and  increase  the  state's
propensity  to  extract  tribute  through  the law-making process. Yet,  as described  above,  few
influential  firms  engage  in  state  capture  and  vice  versa.  Furthermore,  given  that  the
regressions control  for market  behavior  (i.e. innovation  and market  power), the  relationship
between  capture, influence  and  firm performance  is not  consistent  with the hypothesis  that
strong performance  (as a result of market behavior) is the cause of state capture.
A more rigorous method  to check the robustness  of these results to the simultaneity challenge
is  to  replace  the  variables  in  questions  with  instrumental  variables  (IVs) that  are  highly
correlated with  capture and influence",  but unlikely to be caused by the dependent variable,
firmn  performance.  Given the regressions predicting the propensity of firms to be either captor
or influential firms reported  in Table  5, we use the initial degree of the  firm's insecurity of
property and contract  rights (three years ago) as one of our instruments.  Furthermore,  given
the different profiles of captor and influential firms (i.e. predominantly de novo  and state owned
respectively), we use the firm's date of establishment as a second instrument.  To account for
the interaction  of captor firms and the capture economy we also interact both the instruments
with the index of the capture economy.  All four instruments were then  used to  estimate the
performance  regressions  in Table  9. The  sign and  magnitude  of the  coefficients  of captor
firms and influential firms are nearly identical.  The  size of the standard  errors is somewhat,
though  not  substantially, larger than  in the original regressions as might be expected.  These
results suggest that state capture and influence cause the higher growth rates at the firm level.
By controlling for a wide range of other factors that contribute to  firm-level growth rates, the
regression results suggest that both  state capture and influence generate significant rents to the
44 There are three endogenous variables that we wish to instrument for: captor firm, influential firm, and captor firm
interacted  with the extent of the capture economy.25
firm. Though  the  data  do  not  give us  the  opportunity  to  calculate  the  aggregate  level  of  rents
generated  by  these  relationships  and  the  distribution  of  those  rents  between  the  firmn and
public  officials,45 they  do  suggest  that  whatever  state  officials  mnight "grab"  in  the  context  of
these  relationships  there  are still substantial  rents  left  for  the  firm.  In  contrast,  whatever  rents
mnight be  generated  as  a  result  of  administrative  corruption,  they  do  not  appear  to  accrue
directly  to the  firm..'
45  This would  require data  on  the rents received  by public  offcials  as a result of  state capture, which are not  included in  the
BEFPS  survey.  However,  we  do know  that  there is  a difference in  the distribution  of these rents in  relationships  based  on
state capture versus influence,  since the former  entail private payments  to public officials while the latter do not.
46 (f  course given weaknesses  in  the structure  of corporate  governance,  it is possible that  these rents  accrue not  to  the firm
but as private gains to the managers. Yet this would apply equally to any gains deriving from state capture and influence,26
Table 9: Firm  performance  and interactions with the state (IV regressions)47
Independent variables  Dependent variables
Real growth rate of:
Sub-category (Dummy  Sales  Sales  Investment (previous  Investment
variable base category  (previous 3 years)  (next 3 years)  3 years)  (next 3 years)
Category  in parentheses)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Sector  Mining  -8.4  -4.8  -20.2  -7.1
(-0.38)  (-0.32)  (-0.87)  (-0.48)
Services  3.5  -1.3  7.4  3.6
(0.78)  (-0.43)  (1.54)  (1.16)
(Manufacturing)
Origin  De Novo  24.5**  10.7**  25.2**  2
(3.64)  (2.34)  (3.48)  (6l.42)
Privatized  2.1  2.1  11. I  *  -1.7
(0.35)  (0.5)  (1.71)  (-0.41)
(State owned)
Size  Small  -10.6  0.4  -0.3  8.5
(-1.26)  (0.06)  (-0.04)  (1.44)
Medium  -4.3  -1.6  0.9  3.0
(-0.61)  (-0.33)  (0.12)  (0.61)
(Large)
FDI  6.2  8.5**  14.0**  1.5
(1.01)  (2.05)  (2.14)  (0.36)
Innovation  22.2**  13.2**  18.3**  10.I**
(5.05)  (4.4)  (3.86)  (3.28)
Market power  2.2  3.2**  0.5  2.3*
(1.13)  (2.41)  (0.23)  (1.68)
Administrative corruption  -0.7  -0.1  -0.5  -0.1
(-1.45)  (-0.28)  (-0.94)  (-0.17)
Instrumented
Captor Firm  -24.6  -9.8  -1.3  -3.1
(-1.55)  (-0.89)  (-0.08)  (-0.28)
Interaction with the  110.9*  9.7  40.3  -2.3
capture economy  (1.76)  (0.22)  (0.6)  (-0.05)
Influential Firm  16.2**  7.8  23.5**  3.5
(2.03)  (1.43)  (2.74)  (0.63)
1377  1354  1378  1354
R
2 0.11  0.08  0.08  0.05
Econometric model  IV  IV  IV  IV
Instruments: insecurity of property and contract rights, foundation date of the firm, interaction of both these variables
with the extent of the capture economy.
Country dummies included, but not reported
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
47  The two stage approach estimated:
Stage  one.
Captor = a, + nlInsecurity of Property Rights  +  P12  (Insecurity  of Property Rights  x Capture Economy Index) + Po  (Date  of Foundation)  +
P14 p(ate of Foundation x Capture Economy  Index) + (all  other exogenous  variables  from stage 2) +  ml
Captor x Capture Economy Index = a2 + B,,Insecurity  of Property Rights + P22  (Insecurity  of Property Rights  x Capture Economy  Index) +
P23  (Date  of Foundation) + P4 (Date of Foundation x Capture Economy  Index) + (all  other exogenous  variables  from stage 2) +  so
Influence =  3 + P3,Insecurity  of Property Rights  + P32  (Insecurity  of Property Rights  x Capture Economy  Index) +  33 (Date of Foundation)
+  3, (Date of Foundation x Capture Economy  Index) + (all  other exogenous  variables  from stage 2) +  m3
Stage  two  (instrumented  variables  underkned):
Performance = a + yiMining  + y 2Services  + y 3Small  + y 4Medium  + y sDe Novo + y 6Privatised  + y 7FDI + y , Innovation + y, Markct
Power + ysoAdministrative  Corruption + y Capture + yti (Capture  x Capture Economy  Index) + y s3lnfluence  + (country  dummcs) + r27
6. Socials Costs  of the Capture Economy
The regression results above focus on the performance of firms actively engaged in state
capture, but what is the impact of state capture on the vast majority of firms that cannot
capture the state? A rough indication comes from the unconditional performance means
reported in Table 7.  In low capture countries, the average  real rate of sale growth over the
past 3 years is 21.4 percent.  In high capture countries,  where a large number of firms report a
substantial  direct impact on their business from the capture of the state, the average growth
rate falls to  11.1 per cent, despite the considerable  relative gains for captor firms in these
countries. Average real investment rates at the firm level differ substantially  as well.falling
from 21.1  per cent in low capture countries to 11.5  per cent in high capture countries. 48
Controlling  for firm characteristics,  the impact of the capture economy on firm-level  growth
rates remains negative. Table 10 below repeats the performance regressions for sales and
investment from Table 8 but replaces the country dummy variables with an index of the
extent of the capture economy at the country  level reported in Table 2 above. The coefficient
of this variable  gives an estimate of the impact of a high capture environment  on the rate of
sales and investment growth in all firms in that environment or what might be seen as one
component  of  a  measure  of  the  social  costs  of  state  capture.49 The  results  show  that  higher
levels  of  state  capture  in  the  economy  are  significantly  related  to  lower  rates  of  both  sales
growth  and  investment  at  the  firm  level. The  considerable  gains  to  captor  firms  in  the  capture
economy  generate  substantial  negative  externalities  for al  other  firms.
There  are  a number  of  negative  externalities  that  could  potentially  be generated  by the  capacity
of a small share  of powerful  firms  to capture  the  state  and  thus  encode  advantages  into  the
basic legal  and  regulatory  framework.  Captor  firms  could  use  their  relationships  with  public
officials to  erect  barriers  to  entry or  to impose  harsh  regulatory  burdens  on their  competitors.
States  that  are prepared  to sell public  goods  to  individual  firns  on  an  "a la carte"  basis  are
likely to be  undersupplying  those  goods  to  the market  at large.  The  BEEPS  survey provide
data on  the  security  of  property  and  contract  rights  at  the  firm  level, which  would  allow  us to
test for  the  extent  of  such  negative  externalities  on  the  provision  of  a key  set of public  goods.
48 A parallel  division of countries into high and low levels of influence on the basis of the index reported in table 3 did not
produce  any significant  difference  between  these two  groups.  However  a fuller discussion  of the social costs  of influence is
not  possible  using  this measure.  In the  first instance  it is a behavioral  measure and  is not  necessarily a good  proxy  for the
cross-country  irnpact  of influence.  In addition,  it does not  distinguish  between  corrupt  and non-corrupt  forms of influence,
or  between influence  exercised  via collective  action and that  via private  arrangements  between  individual firms  and officials.
These  distinctions  are likely to  be crucial to understanding  the broader  implications of the exercise of influence.
49 One  could imagine a number of other potential  sodal  and political costs associated with  state capture  beyond  the impact on
firm  performance.  For  a  fuller  discussion  of the  negative  consequences  of  state  capture  for  the  process  of  transition  see
World Bank (2000).28
Table 10: The social costs of the capture  economy for firm performance
Independent variables  Dependent  variables
Real growth rate of:
Sub-category  (Dummy  Sales (previous  3 years)  Investment  (previous  3 years)
variable  base category  in
Category  parentheses)  (2)
Sector  Mining  -3.9  -12.5
(-0.2)  (-0.64)
Services  5.8  7.9*
(1.46)  (1.92)
(Manufacturing)
Origin  DeNovo  28.4**  25.1**
(4.71)  (3.99)
Privatized  5.5  11.1**
(1.02)  (1.95)
(State  owned)
Size  Small  -18.5**  -5.7
(-2.4)  (-0.72)
Medium  -8.7  -0.9
(-1.32)  (-0.13)
(Large)  __
FDI  9.9*  16.8**
(1.77)  (2.91)
Innovation  24.7**  20.5**
(6.28)  (5)
Market power  4.4**  0.7
(2.49)  (0.37)
Captor Firm  -21.8  -1.1
(-1.5)  (-0.07)
Interaction  with  the  106.7**  37.9
capture  economy  (1.95)  (0.67)
Influential  Firm  13*  23.4**
(1.86)  (3.21)
Administrative  corruption  -0.9**  *-0.7*
(-2.29)  (-1.69)
Capture Economy  -41.3**  -45.1**
Icross-country  measure]  (-2.39)  (-2.52)
N  1617  1612
P7  0.07  0.06
Econometric  model  OLS  OLS
** significant  at 5% level;  * significant  at 10%  level. t-statistics  in  parentheses.29
7. State Capture,  Influence and the Security  of Property  and Contract  Rights
In an earlier  section,  we showed that the different perceptions of the security  of property and
contract rights affected the propensity of firms to engage  in state capture or have influence
over state decisions.  Firms with greater insecurity  were shown to be more likely to engage  in
state capture, while  influential  firms enjoyed  much more secure  property rights. Yet if capture
is, to some extent, motivated by the insecurity  of property  and contract rights, does it generate
a demonstrable improvement for captor firms in these rights over time? If so, how does this
affect the property rights of other firms that do not (or cannot) engage  in state capture?
The BEEPS survey  asked firms to assess  how the security  of their property and contract  rights
has changed over the past three years. 0 This gives us an opportunity to  investigate how
different types of relationships between the firm and the state affect the evolution of the
security  of property  rights for individual  captor and influential  firms, as well as to compare the
aggregate  affects on such rights at the country level over time. Table 11 presents the results of
an ordered  probit regression  on the change of the security  of property and contract rights.
The regression controls for the initial  level or insecurity  of property rights three years ago to
account for the fact that the change over time might depend upon the initial  starting  point. As
might be expected, firms starting with higher insecurity show the greatest probability of
strengthening  the security  of these rights over time. However, de novo  and privatized firms are
less  likely to have seen an improvement in the security of their property and contract rights
over time relative to remaining state-owned firms. This raises doubts about the view that
priLvatization  and new entry have created an effective  constituency  to push for the institutional
reforms that might increase their security  of property rights over time, though the change is
measured over a relatively  short time frame.
The firms that are most likely  to have strengthened the security  of their property rights over
tiime  are captor firms, especially  in high capture economies.  Though the positive coefficient  of
the  captor  dummy variable in  regression (I) is  only marginally significant, it  increases
substantially  in both magnitude and significance  when interacted with the capture economy
inclex  in regression  (2). Captor firms appear to have succeeded  in doing something that most
new entrants and privatized firms have been umable  to achieve  - to gain greater protection of
their property rights over time.5 1 In contrast, influential  firms,  which started from a position  of
greater security, experience no such differential imnprovement  in  their property rights over
time.
Yet the magnitude  of the achievement  by captor firms in high capture economies  is even more
impressive  when compared with the fate of all other firms in these high capture economies.
An. index of the capture economy at the country level in Table 11 shows that firms in high
capture economies are much more likely to have seen a reduction in the security of their
50  Firms were asked whether they agreed  with the following  statement both at present and three years ago: "I am confident
that the legal system wil uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes."  In this regression, the dependent
variable takes the values +i  indicating  an improvement in the security of property rights over the period, 0 indicating  no
change and -1 indicating  a deterioration. No attempt was made to measure  the magnitude of the change in property rights,
since the measures  of the security of property rights in the two periods are simply  ordinal variables.
51  A second set of regressions,  unreported here, also controlled for innovation,  to examine  the hypothesis that since capture
and innovation are correlated at the firm level,  the relationship  between capture and improved protection of property rights is
the :result  of greater demand for protection by innovative  firms. The coefficient  of innovation was insignificant  and therc was
no substantial  change  in the coefficients  on the other variables.30
property and contract rights over time. Thus, captor firms have been able to purchase through
private payments to public officials  individualized  protection of their ptoperty and contract
rights from the state on an "a la carte" basis in an environment where such secutity has been
deteriorating over  time for  most  other firms, in  particular for  other new  entrants and
privatized firms.
If individual firms can purchase under-provided public goods directly from the state on the
basis of private payments  to public officials,  then these officials  will not have strong incentives
to improve the overall provision of such goods given the risk of  reducing their bribe income.
Consequently  state capture, while strengthening  the position of a small share of firms, would
appear to undermine the broader provision of a key public good by the state which,  might
contribute to  an  explanation of  the lower growth rates of  non-captor  firms in  capture
economies.
The sharp contrast between the private benefits and social costs of state capture in the
provision of secure property and  contract tights also helps to  explain the clear threshold
effects described above separating  high and low capture economies. State capture reduces the
security  of property and contract rights for non-captor firms,  which, as we have shown above,
increases the propensity of other firms to engaged  in state capture. Thus captor firms beget
more firms seeking  to capture the state at different levels  of the political  system.31
Table  11: The change in the security of property  and contract  rights
Independent variables  Dependent variables
Sub-category (Dummy  The change in the security of property and
variable  base category  contract rights
Category  in parentheses)  (1)  (2)
Origin  De Novo  -0.26**  -0.26**
(-2.22)  (-2.23)
Privatized  -0.22**  -0.22**
(-2.17)  (-2.13)
(State)
Size  Small  -0.13  -0.12
(-1.32)  (-1.26)
Medium  -0.21  **  -0.21**
(-2.47)  (-2.41)
(Large)
Captor  Firm  0.17*  -0.33
(1.69)  (-1.45)
Interaction with  2.23**
the capture economy  (2.45)
Influential Firm  0.01  0.01
(0.1)  (0.12)
Insecurity of property and  0.26**  0.26**
Contract  rights  (10.9)  (10.9)
Capture economy  -0.88**
[cross-country measure]  (-3.17)  (-3.77)
N  1916  1916
Pseudo  R2  0.06  0.06
Econometric  model  Ordered probit  Ordered probit
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.32
8. Origins  of the Capture  Economy
Though our focus has been on the microeconomic  incentives  which underlie the decisions  of
firms to attempt to capture the state,  we have also shown how these incentives  are shaped by
the overall extent of the capture economy in each country. In this section we begin a very
tentative examination of the factors that might explain the extent of state capture at the
aggregate  level.
We focus on the role of civil liberties, 52 which we view as an exogenous  variable that affects
both the supply of and demand for state capture. On the supply side, civil  liberties  are a proxy
for the constraints that effective  oversight  by civil society can place on public officials.  Such
oversight  raises the costs to politicians  of actions that provide highly concentrated gains to a
small set of powerful actors while imposing substantial costs on  everyone else. On the
demand side we would expect the initial increase in the level of civil liberties relative  to the
communist system to increase the demand for state capture by newly autonomous firms.
Thus, the effects of political liberalization  on the aggregate  level of capture in a given  country
are a pnonr  ambiguous and depend on the extent to which the impact of liberalization  on
supply  or demand dominates.
Table 12: Measures of economic and social liberalization























Interpretation  of idices:  Index  ranges  from  I to 7 where  I is
most  free  and  7 is  least  free.
52 We do not suggest  that such a simple mono-causal  explanation  can fully  account for a phenomenon as complex  as state
capture. However, we  do  believe that the  relationship investigated here  represents an  important component in  any
understanding  of the problem.33
In Table 12 we present a measure of the extent of civil liberties according to  the index
developed by Freedom House, which states that  "civil liberties include the freedoms to
develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state." 53 Each country is
assessed  on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). The index has been compiled annually
since 1972  and we use the average  score for the three most recent years.
In the simple  illustrative  regressions  presented in Table 13,  the dependent variable  is the index
of  the  capture economy at the  country level from Table 2.  Since the initial stage of
liberalization  mnight  lead to increases  in state capture in comparison  with the previous system,
followed  by a decrease in the capture index as civil  society oversight  increases  over time, the
relationship  between civil liberties  and the propensity  to engage  in state capture is unlikely  to
be linear.  The key point reflected  in the regressions  is the inverted U-shape  of the relationship.
T:he first pair of regressions on the extent of state capture includes all 22 countries.  The
second pair of regressions excludes  Belarus  and Uzbekistan,  since  private sector development
has been very limited in these countries and the very notion of state capture by the corporate
sector  in these countries is potentially  inapplicable.
Table 13: Regressions of state capture vs. civil liberties
Dependent  Countries  Independent  variables
variable  in sample  Civil liberties  (Civil liberties) 2 R 2
Extent  of  22  0.010  - 0.014
state capture  (0.529)
22  0.336**  -0.044**  0.467
(4.08)  (-4.02)
Extent of  201  0.049**  - 0.232
state capture  (2.33)
201  0.470**  -0.066**  0.406
(2.48)  (-2.32)
t the  smaller  sample  excluded  Belarus  and  Uzbekistan
* significant  at 1D%  **  significant  at  5%  t-statistics  in parentheses.
The regressions are merely suggestive  of some interesting trends that could merit further
research:
*  The relationship  between civil  liberties  and state capture in the full sample of 22 countries
is non-linear and can be characterized  as an inverted-U which we encapsulate with a
quadratic term. The partial introduction of civil liberties  in some countries is associated
with  the  emerence  of  state capture.  In  these  countries,  the  initial  introduction of  civil
liberties (and other checks on abuse of power related to the supply of state capture) is
insufficient  to counterbalance  the loss of control that has resulted from the dismantling  of
the controlling apparatus of the Communist  Party. In contrast, once a threshold of basic
civil  liberties has been reached further reforms in this area are associated  with much lower
53 See htp:! /9  w.trcdons  uscorg for more details on the indeK  and methodology.  In brief, each country is assessed
according  to criteria grouped under: freedom of expression and belief;  association  and organizational  rights; rule of law and
human rights;  personal autonomy; and economic rights.34
levels  of state capture, as increasing  civil society  oversight  raises the costs to politicians  of
state capture.
*  Excluding Belarus and  Uzbekistan, the relationship between civil liberties and  state
capture is still non-linear (although the ability  of a linear relationship  to represent the data
is improved, since by construction we exclude the least liberal countries). This suggests
that the association of partial civil liberalization and increased  capture is not dependent
solely  on these countries, even though these are the key examples of transition countries
with low levels of civil liberties. Put differently,  there are other transition countries that
are yet to reach the point where civil society is sufficiently  developed to control state
capture.
Further research should investigate  other structural features of the political system that might
increase the costs to politicians  of colluding  with firms to provide concentrated gains through
state capture.35
9. Summary and Conclusions
T'hough  much of the existing  literature on the political  economy of transition has focused on
the dynamics of state control over the economy, this paper has placed primary emphasis on
the ways in which  firms exert influence on  and  collude with public officials to  extract
advantages.  The BEEPS data have provided a unique opportunity to differentiate  channels of
firm influence on the state and to unbundle corruption to examine  variation both across and
within the transition countries. The analysis  has provided new insights into the origins and
dynamics  of the capture economy - an economy in which a relatively  small  share of firms has
managed to capture public officials  at various levels of the state to extract concentrated rents
and to purchase individualized  provision by the state of under-provided public goods. The
analysis has also demonstrated that the private gains to capture are clearly associated with
substantial social costs in capture economies both in terms of overall economic performance
and  the capacity or  commitment of  the  state to  provide critical public goods  for  the
development of the market economy. 54
State capture and influence are in  evidence in  all transition economies (as they are in  all
economies across the globe). However, the advantages to the firrn of such activities can be
sharply contrasted in different contexts. There is a group of transition economies in which the
impact of state capture by a  narrow group of  firms is  quite widely felt by many firms
throughout the economy. In contrast, there are other transition  economies in which firms may
seek to influence the state through capture, but there are constraints which prevent the state
from distorting the legal and regulatory framework  to the advantage  of a few powerful firms.
The dynamics  of state capture in each group are quite different.
In the capture economy, capture tends to be a strategy of innovative de novo  firms trying to
compete in a  market dominated by influential incumbent firms with close historical and
formal ties to the state and substantial advantages in terms of market share. As the state in
such an environment tends to under-provide such critical public goods as the security of
property and contract rights, the most dynamic de novo  firms seek to purchase such services  on
an individualized  basis directly from public officials along with other advantages to enhance
their performance.  They would appear to engage  in capture not as a substitute for innovation
in the marketplace, but as a complementary  strategy to compensate for weaknesses in the
overall legal framework.
The analysis  has shown that capture does generate substantial  gains to the firm both in terms
of performance  and improved security  of property rights, but only in the capture economy. In
settings  where the state faces greater constraints in its capacity  to distort the legal framework
to advantage  a narrow group of firms - in turn associated  with greater political  liberalization  --
the few firms engaging in capture exhibit weaker firm performance and fewer gains in terms
of the protection of property rights. In contrast with the capture economy, in such settings
firm-level  capture and market innovation do appear to be substitutes.
Thus, in the capture economy, many dynamic new firms have strong incentives to engage in
state capture which further weakens  the state's capacity  or commitment to enhance security of
54 This pattern of concentrated gains  to firms with the capacity  to encode their advantages  in the legal and regulatory  structure
at a high social cost is consistent with the argument that the main political obstacles to reform in transition economies have
been  the early winners  from partial economic  reforms  as argued in HelUman (1998).36
property and contract rights. This, in turn, strengthens the incentives  for other de  novo firms to
engage  in state capture creating  a vicious  circle that can undermine growth and stymie  further
progress  in economic reform. A recognition of  the dynamics of  the capture economy
suggests  a political economy framework for understanding the very divergent paths that are
now clearly  evident among the transition countries.
The need to shift the focus of refortn to  strategies for addressing the way in which firms
interact with the state is the main implication  of this paper.  Though this implies deepening
the process of economic and political liberalization  that was the main challenge of the initial
stage of transition, it also leads to a new focus on measures  to channel the strategies of firms
away from state capture to more legitimate forms of influence through a combination of
societal  'voice', transparency  reforms, political accountability  and economic competition -- as
suggested  by our preliminary  analysis  of the positive impact of enhancing civil liberties  once a
threshold of reform has been reached.
Where state capture has distorted the process of reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic
structures supported by powerful political interests, the challenge is particularly daunting.
Strategies need to  be  formulated combining a  gradual demonopolization with an activist
stance on competition and entry policy,  coupled with mobilizing  societal  voice - and inter  alia
mnaking  transparent  the  social costs  of  state capture  to  the  population, to  pro-reform
constituencies and NGOs. Strategies aimed at mobilizing collective  action and empowering
competitive  constituencies  should be given greater  prominence.
We end with a word of caution. This paper is an initial effort into the empirical  investigation
of state capture and other forms of high-level  corruption in transition. Future research would
need to aim to develop filly a conceptual framework  modeling the interaction between firms
and politicians  where, as emphasized  in this paper, the firm does play an active 'captor' role (as
well as recognizing the activist role that some predatory politicians may also play).  The
literature on regulatory capture, suitably  integrated with the recent analytical  work in the field
of corruption, offers particular  promise in this context.
*** ***********  ****  ****  ***  ** *************37
Appendix
In this appendix we present some additional data and information.  Table Al  presents
tabulations of the BEEPS sample by country and according to the size, origin and whether
or not the firm has any foreign direct investment.
Table Al: The sample composition of the BEEPS
Country  Total  Origin  FDP  Size
firms*  De  Privatizea  State  Small  Medium  Large
ANovo
Albania  i63  92  31  34  21  103  54  6
Armenia  125  63  34  25  2  80  40  5
Azerbaijan  137  93  17  25  13  87  48  2
Belarus  132  50  56  25  15  32  86  14
Bulgaria  130  77  26  25  17  68  50  12
Croatia  127  34  66  27  17  31  68  28
C'zechRepublic  149  113  10  25  33  96  40  13
Estonia  132  73  26  25  26  59  59  14
Georgia  129  75  29  25  18  65  59  5
Hlungary  147  94  24  25  27  91  42  14
Kazakhstan  147  69  47  27  27  72  65  10
Kyrgyzstan  132  50  57  25  15  41  86  5
Latvia  166  88  25  33  41  70  76  18
Lithuania  112  84  26  0  6  93  16  3
Moldova  139  47  57  25  16  50  77  12
Poland  246  160  53  25  40  115  108  23
Romania  125  85  15  25  20  77  37  11
Russia  552  283  230  25  37  212  301  39
Slovak Republic  138  84  26  25  15  78  49  11
Slovenia  125  41  54  25  17  37  76  12
Ukraine  247  147  73  25  30  124  100  23
Uzbekistan  126  44  52  25  18  40  69  17
*Due to occasional missing responses the sum of all firms in each subcategory is sometimes less
than the total number of firms in each country.
Table  A2  contains  a summary  of  all the  variables  used  in the  micro-level  regressions,  including
the  survey  definition  from  the  BEEPS,  the  tables  in which  the  variable  is used  and  summary
measures  of  maximum,  minimum,  mean,  standard  deviation  and  number  of  observations.  We
first  list  the  dependent  variables,  then  the  independent  variables  and  finally  instrumental
variables.
55 F-or  an empirical analysis of the link between FDI, corruption and influence see Hellman, Jones and
Kaufmnann  (2000).Table A2: Definitions and summary statistics for the variables  used in the econometric analyses
Variable  N  Sub-  Table  Variable definition (question in the BEEPS survey)  Min  max  mean  Standard  Number of
Category  Number  Deviation  Observations
Dependent  variables
Sales  (previous  3  1  8,9,10  By what  percentage  have  your company's  sales changed  in real  -90  900  15.6  71.3  3492
years)  terms  over  the  previous  3 years?
Sales  (next  3  2  8,9,10  By what percentage  do you expect your company's sales to  -95  800  24.6  54.6  3426
years)  change  in real  terms  over  the next  3 years?
Investment  3  8,9,10  By what  percentage  has your company's  investment  changed  in  -100  999  15.6  72.2  3484
(previous  3 years)  real terms  over  the previous  3 years?
Investment  (next  4  8,9,10  By what percentage  do you expect  your company's  investment  -100  900  16.9  50.6  3423
3 years)  to change  in real  terms  over  the  next 3 years?
Change  in the  5  11  How has the security  of property  and contract  rights changed  -1  1  .075  0.71  3062
security  of  over  the previous  three  years?
property  and  -I worsened,  0 no change,  I improved.
contract  rights
Administrative  6  4  What  percent  of revenues  do firms like  yours typically  pay per  0  0.25  0.03  0.05  2689
corruption  annum  in unofficial  payments  to public  officials?
0%; 1%;  2%;  6%; 11%;  19%;  25%.
Influence  7  4  When  a new law, rule regulation  of decree  is being discussed  1  5  1.4  0.8  2421
that could have a  substantial  impact on your business, how
much  influence does  your  firn  typically have  with  the
executive, legislative,  ministry and regulatory branches of
government  to try to influence  the content of that law, rule
regulation  or decree?
Each was ranked on a  scale I  never influential,  2 seldom
influential, 3  influential,  4  frequently influential, 5  very
influential,  and the mean  across  the four  dimensions  used.
State  capture  8  4  How often  do firms like yours nowadays  need to make extra,  1  6  1.3  0.9  2874
unofficial  payments  to public  officials  to influence  the content
of new  laws,  decrees  and regulations?
I  never, 2 seldom, 3  sometimes,  4 frequently,  5  mostly, 6
always.
Independent  variables
Sector  9  Mining  8,9,10  No subcategories.  0  1  0.01  0.09  3623
10  Services  8,9,10-  Firms  describing themselves as  trading/wholesale,  retail,  0  1  0.49  0.50  3623
transport,  financial  services,  personal  services,  business  services
I  Manufacturing  8,9,10  Firms  describing themselves as  farming/fishing/forestry.  0  1  0.50  0.50  3623
manufacture/repair,  building/construction,  power  generation.
Size  12  Small  4,8,9,10,11  Firms with  less  than 50 full  time  employees.  0  1  0.47  0.50  3624
13  Medium  4,8,9,10,11  Firms  with  between  50 and  500 full  time  employees.  0  1  0.44  0.50  3624
14  Large  4,8,9,10,11  Firms  with  more  than 500  full  time  employees.  0  1  0.09  0.27  3624
Origin  15  DeNovo  4,8,9,10,11  Firms  with  no state owned  predecessor.  0  1  0.55  0.50  352616  Privatized  4,8,9,10,11  Formerly state owned firms.  0  1  0.29  0.46  3526
17  State owned  4,8,9,10,11  Firms in which the state remains the majority owner.  0  1  0.15  0.36  3526
FDI  18  8,9,10  Firms in which some foreign company has a financial stake.  0  1  0.13  0.34  3619
Market power  19  4,8,9,10  If you were to raise your prices of your main product line 10%  1  4  2.2  1.1  3516
above their current level (after allowing for any inflation and
assuming that your competitors maintained their current prices),
which of the following would best describe the result? Many of
our customers would buy from our competitors instead (I);  Our
customers would continue to buy from us, but at much lower
quantities (2); Customers would continue to buy from us, but at
slightly lower quantities (3); Customers would continue to buy
from us in the same quantities as now (4).
Bureaucratic  20  4  How often is the following statement true?  If a govemment  1  6  3.1  1.6  3070
recourse  agent acts against the rules I can usually go to another official
or to his superior and get the correct treatment without recourse
to unofficial payments.
Never (I);  Seldom (2); Sometimes (3); Frequently (4); Mostly
(5); Always (6).
Insecurity of  21  4,11  To what degree would you agree with this statement three years  1  6  3.6  1.3  3063
property and  ago?  I  am confident that  the legal  system will uphold my
contract rights  contract and property rights in business disputes
Fully agree (I) Agree in most cases(2); Tend to agree(3); Tend
to disagree(4); Disagree in most cases(5); Strongly disagree(6).
Innovation  22  8, 9, 10  Has your firm successfully developed a new product line?  0  1  0.30  0.46  3626
Captor Firm  23  8,9,10,11  See 8. Firms responding sometimes or more frequently.  0  1  0.09  0.29  2874
Influential Firm  25  8,9,10,11  See 7. Firms scoring 2.5 or more.  0  1  0.07  0.26  2801
Administrative  26  8,9,10  See 6.  0  0.25  0.03  0.05  2689
Corruption
Capture Economy  24  8,9,10,11  Country  level  measure  of  the  extent  of  state  capture  as  0.06  0.41  0.21  0.11  3626
presented in table 2.
Instrumental variables
Insecurity  of  27  9  See 21.  1  6  3.6  1.3  3063
property and
contract rights
Foundation date  28  9  In what year was you firm founded?  1806  1999  1987  18.6  3548Finally, table A3 gives a measure of the concentration  of state  capture  as referred  to briefly in footnote  22.
We present  this measure only in the capture economies.  The variable is constructed  as the ratio of the
extent  of  state capture  (table 2) and  the  proportion  of capturing  firms (table  3) and  measures  the
degree  to  which  the  impact  of  state  capture  is  attributable  to  a  small number  of  firms.  Larger
numbers  indicate that state capture is confined to a smaller proportion  of firms.  Further research will
investigate this variable.
Table  A3: The  concentration  of state capture
Concentration










Slovak  Republic  2.00
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